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Summary
In the last two decades of the twentieth century there has been an upsurge of interest
in self and identity studies. Through the bifocal lens of consciousness studies and
black feminisms this article sets out to explore how the self is textually represented
by the South African writer Ellen Kuzwayo, in her autobiography Call me woman,
and the African-American author Toni Morrison, in her fictional Beloved. The aim is
to show that although both writers are black and may represent commonalities there
are also many differences in their depictions of the female consciousness that ultima-
tely takes its shape from interactions within its own social milieu.
‘Ek’ en ‘ons’: die skryf van die swart vroulike ego in
Kuzwayo se Call me woman en Morrison se Beloved
Tydens die laaste twee dekades van die twintigste eeu was daar ’n toenemende be-
langstelling in self- en identiteitsnavorsing. Deur die bifokale lens van bewussynstu-
die en swart feminismes poog hierdie artikel om die eie-ek soos tekstueel deur die
Suid-Afrikaanse skryfster Ellen Kuzwayo in haar outobiografie, Call me woman, en
deur die Afro-Amerikaanse outeur Toni Morrison in die roman Beloved neerslag ge-
gee, te ontleed. Daar sal aangetoon word dat, alhoewel beide skrywers swart is en
daar dus raakpunte tussen hulle ervarings mag wees, daar beslis ook verskille is in
hulle voorstelling van vroulike bewuswording wat uiteindelik vorm aanneem binne
die betrokke sosiale milieu.
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The intention in this article is to examine the textual delinea-tions of the self in Kuzwayo’s autobiographical, factual Call mewoman and Morrison’s third-person, fictional Beloved, two
genres of writing broadly taken to be quite different in approach,
expression and effect. The literature based on the real (autobiograph)
will be shown to overlap with imaginative literature just as the slave
narrative, to an extent, coincides with the autobiographical in the way
the self is made to emerge. The sense of the self under scrutiny is not
a reflection of the writers’ characters or personalities, although that
immediately comes to mind in relation to Kuzwayo’s autobiography.
Rather by “self” is meant, notwithstanding Kuzwayo’s autobiographi-
cal obligations, interpretation from the perspective of an identity and
its effect as textuality. The concern with the inscribed self is in terms,
further, of accountability — of identity and woman narratives.
The playing out of the textual self in texts by women who operate
in different milieux will also be related to black feminist theory to
show that, like white feminisms, it is pluralistic and very much part
of the pervasive textual politics, that is, the connection between the
texts’ grammatical, figurative and structural patterns and their as-
sembly of subtexts (Jones 1989). The suitability of the selected texts
to reflect on, illuminate, comment on and also differ from each other
in the representations of the black woman’s self, particularly in its re-
visioning through motherhood, will become evident in this process.
1 Reading paradigms
Of direct relevance is the self emanating from consciousness studies
as reported by Keith Sutherland (2001: 18-9) in his retrospective
overview, “Mind, matter and the search for the ‘self’”, wherein he
traces the revival of interest and major hypotheses from the 1980s to
the 1990s. An almost century-long embargo had been imposed by
the insistence of behaviourism on confining investigations to obser-
vable phenomena rather than subjective mental states. Not always
clearly understood, this complicated area of study (which began in
the misty past with pre-eminent philosophers and scientists such as
Aristotle, John Locke and David Hume, through to Sir Anthony
Kenny, James Austen, Andy Newberg, Chalmers, Searly, Dennett
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and Freeman, to name those most frequently connected with unravel-
ling its mysteries) continues to be marked by a divergence of views.
While the 1990s may have been most aptly labelled the “Decade
of the brain” in light of the primacy of interest, research during this
period still did not lead to much conceptual clarification. The
theories that have emerged nonetheless offer other possibilities: that
is, while they may remind us that the “final frontier” of knowledge
of the self still stretches bafflingly before us, they do offer interesting
insights towards an improved understanding of the textualisation of
the self, or, as behaviourism would have it, the observable phenome-
na. Of particular relevance to the two texts selected for examination
are, for example, “memory as the mechanism responsible for continu-
ity of the self”, identity over time and the notion of the self as a
“product of reflection” or interpretation (Sutherland 2001: 19). Of
pertinence, as well, is the work by Michael Gazzaniga of Dartmouth
College on split-brain patients, showing how “the concept of the self
is constructed by the ‘interpreter’ mechanism located in the left cere-
bral hemisphere” (Sutherland 2001: 19). The “interpreter” devises
“an imaginary narrative consistent enough to maintain a stable con-
cept of self” (Sutherland 2001: 19). Sutherland goes on to report how
social psychologists and anthropologists have also shown how the self
that is constructed in social interaction varies from culture to culture.
Although black feminist theory, which emerged as a reaction to
white feminisms, is not directly referred to in the texts in question it
does make its presence felt as will become evident during the course
of this discussion. Like consciousness studies and white feminist the-
ory, it too is marked by divergencies. For our current purposes a
thumbnail sketch of the major strands of this body of formulations
about the experiences of women should suffice to give an idea of their
affinities and dissonances with one another as well as with the two
focal texts. In the discussion that follows on the selected texts certain
connections that are brought to the fore will be developed.
To begin with, Hendricks & Lewis (1994) distinguish three major
strands in black feminist theory: black feminism, womanism and
African feminism. Black feminism, an African-American initiative,
emerged in reaction to the masculinism of anti-racist struggles and
the dominance of white women in feminist politics; it dealt with
38
Acta Academica 2002: 34(2)
strategies and subject-matter not catered for in white women’s lite-
rary traditions. The local counterpart, as articulated by Dabi Nkulu-
leko (1987: 91, 104), reiterates the need for liberation from male in-
fluence and from the dominance of white women in the feminist
movement as well as the development of “new theories, constructs
and concepts which [...] capture what is real in Africa”.
The second strand, womanism, besides bifurcating into African-
American and African strands, as a whole also mutates into a South
African version. For the African-American Alice Walker it is about the
spirituality of black women, a pre-requisite for creativity. To the Nige-
rian Ogunyemi ‘womanism’ incorporates the racial, cultural, national,
economic and political, leading inevitably to the subordination of
gender hierarchies to racial solidarity. The aim of the mandalic core at
the heart of womanism, according to Ogunyemi (1985: 78), “is the
dynamism of wholeness and self-healing that one sees in the positive,
integrative endings of womanist novels”.
The mysticism and romanticism of womanism, as conceived
above, take us back to essentialising, that is the fixing and freezing
of the attributes of women and blacks, yet in the 1980s it was locally
reproduced as racial solidarity over and above the gender struggle. It
manifested in subordinate, nurturing positions in the national libe-
ration movement. As a direct consequence of this, ambiguity conti-
nues to inhere in mothering and particularly motherhood in as it
loops right back into essentialism. bell hooks (1984) complicates this
aspect of womanism even more by explicating the role of the family
as the site of resistance in the face of racism. Adding further to the
ambiguity is the mainstream re-assessment of mothering that follow-
ed (McNeil 1992).
African feminism, the third strand, is very much like the essen-
tialising and romanticising of womanism in depictions of a paradi-
siacal pre-colonial Africa and matrilineal social, economic and politi-
cal power. Locally it has manifested in prioritising the anti-apartheid
struggle at the expense of class and gender concerns. There is a nos-
talgic tendency among African feminist adherents, such as Christine
Qunta (1987) for instance, to affirm a matrilineage by idealistically
reclaiming African heroines. In contrast there are also those like
39
Sarinjeive/“I” and “we”: the black female self
Christine Obbo (1981) who are more critically aware of pre-colonial,
colonial and neo-colonial gender oppression.
The commonalities and differences of the black feminisms sketch-
ed above as well as specificity, situatedness and positionality are ta-
ken into account in the examination of the experiences of the self re-
corded in the texts in question. Furthermore, besides reflecting and
perhaps inflecting understanding of the major strands of black femi-
nist theory as a whole, the diversities, nuances and finer shades of
meaning in the experience and understanding of oppression of the
central female consciousness in textual representations will also serve
to reveal the constrictions of black woman-centredness, for instance
in the way patriarchy is envisioned and its effect on the textual pro-
duction of the self.
2 Broad overview
Before investigating the representations of the self it will be useful
first to see how the texts compare broadly. For a start Kuzwayo’s text
is, as Coullie (1996: 132) writes, about both a “generalized black wo-
man and a particular woman” in “neither western nor traditional
black autobiographical discourse [while relying on both], by finding
a space between these frames”. Kuzwayo represents how she under-
stands herself and the conditions of her life by use of the first person,
“I”, “my”, “we” and “us”. It is clearly more than her individual power
to mean since she also draws on cultural sources. In this way the text
is unlike conventional autobiographies since there is less focus on the
personal self. The “I” is also the “we” of voiceless, disadvantaged
black South African women at a time of particularly harsh oppression
and discrimination. While this may also hold for the third-person
fictionalised story of black slaves in Beloved in terms of authorship,
given what happens to the self in slavery, there is decidedly more em-
phasis placed on the unceasing struggle to reconstruct an identity
that has been systematically destroyed.
In addition, both Kuzwayo and Morrison use the oppressor’s lan-
guage, English, which threatens as it imposes even while it provides
spaces in-between for writing back against stereotypical approaches
and representations of black women. In Showalter’s (1985: 263)
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terms, it is a “‘double-voiced discourse’ that always embodies the so-
cial, literary, and cultural heritages of both the muted and [the]
dominated”. Further, Morrison, for example, uses a circular narrative,
in black speech patterns that evoke oral performance, to contest
representations of black women by white and black American male
writers like Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison and James Baldwin. And
Kuzwayo’s Call me woman is a controlled first person, a specifically
focused response to Matshoba’s Call me not a man, in which the main
story begins with, “For neither am I a man in the eyes of the law,/
Nor am I a man in the eyes of my fellow-man” (Matshoba 1979: 18).
Matshoba concentrates on the emasculation and debasement of the
African male under apartheid atrocities and laws. In contrast, in Call
me woman Kuzwayo presents women as either defying gun-toting po-
liceman (Kuzwayo 1985: 49-50) or taking “the whole responsibility”
for the family and life, notably in rural areas (Kuzwayo 1985: 12).
However, while Kuzwayo (1985: 51) may say “Women somehow
seem to cope with the pressures more successfully than men” her tex-
tual rendition of woman requires further scrutiny, particularly in re-
lation to representations in Beloved.
In Morrison’s novel the community of the mid-1800s is in mul-
tiple exiles; it is descended from slaves forcibly uprooted from their
homeland and deliberately mixed with other slaves from various re-
gions of Africa to disorientate and confuse; and it has nothing to fall
back on except memories and slave experiences. Kuzwayo, as textual
configuration, is in another way in a sort of exile in the apartheid
townships; the exile of othering and forced removals backed by legis-
lation is recorded by Kuzwayo along with resistance by various com-
munity groups before part one of her text. She writes “Blacks are so-
journers” (Kuzwayo 1985: 7); they are named and renamed “natives”,
“Bantu” and “plurals” (Kuzwayo 1985: 5); similarly Paul D in Beloved
says that the schoolteacher beat him “to show him that definitions
belonged to the definers — not the defined” (Morrison 1987: 190).
It is against this background of homelessness and exile, physical
and of the psyche, more so in Beloved, that the representation of the
self is examined to show how physical alienation is reflected in self-
alienation. The discussion will alternate between Kuzwayo and Mor-
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rison in order to juxtapose similarities and differences as the othered
self struggles to reclaim and refashion itself.
3 The struggle to maintain the communal self
To start with “in the eyes of the law”, as Matshoba says, the initial
image of the black woman in the first section of Call me woman is as a
prisoner who writes a letter to her mother and mentions other names,
Sis Gladys, Lindy, Buti Ntshwene, Babone, Tembu Bobo, Ousi Ma-
tantase, T J and K (Kuzwayo 1985: 3-4). In spite of her prisoner sta-
tus, the individual self, “I”, remains connected to the communal self,
the symbolic base and home. Debra Nkiwe Matshoba, the writer of
the letter, who is imprisoned under Section 10 of the Terrorism Act,
considers the outside contact it allows her as being “at home”, a phrase
bristling with ironies. In this opening section where Kuzwayo de-
scribes the various oppressions of apartheid life, she as writer is a part
of the generalised black suffering which includes that of black leaders
such as the traditional “Kgosi, Morena and Nkosi [all meaning
king]”, who are levelled down to “‘chief’, an inferior status command-
ing far less dignity and respect” (Kuzwayo 1985: 13).
The sentiment “Motho ke motho ka motho yo mongoe” (No man
is an island) in the Setswana language is lived out by the self repre-
sented in spite of the erosion of much of the traditional moral code
and values that followed  the displacement of “communities, sepa-
rated families, estranged siblings”, leaving the community “landless,
homeless, stateless and dispossessed of all its heritage” (Kuzwayo
1985: 17). Legislation, “the eyes of the law”, has reduced human be-
ings not only to prisoners, like Debra Nkiwe Matshoba (and Kuz-
wayo herself who at the age of 63 was imprisoned under Section 10
for being a member of the Committee of Ten, in 1977), but also to
“villains”, “scoundrels”, “underdogs”, “outlaws”, and “criminals”, in
mass demonisation (Kuzwayo 1985: 17).
4 Socialising of the communal self
But certain aspects of the self that are ideologically overwritten con-
tinue in their own way and as they did before the formalisation of
apartheid othering. The “I” of Kuzwayo says in the beginning of the
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second section, the autobiography proper, for instance, that when she
became aware of herself at the age of six or seven years it was as “one
of four grandchildren” (all girls significantly) of a middle-class, pro-
fessional, propertied extended family; Granny was “mother” and
Grandpa “Papa” (Kuzwayo 1985: 63). The sense of “we” is encou-
raged by the wearing of dresses made from the same material. There
is some awakening of the individual in the children’s lack of enthu-
siasm for the uniform dress but with grandmother “there was no non-
sense about clothes”; at the same time they [“we”] were “different
from the neighbourhood children” [“them”] (Kuzwayo 1985 63).
The writer seems to present an idealised seamless ubuntu front,
often as desire when it threatens to disintegrate, and at the same time
to undercut it with the real. For instance, there are moments when
the ‘I’ felt ‘alone’ as ‘one Merafe’ or as the child of divorced parents,
but these are few and far between; they are not allowed to oversha-
dow the forefronting of the communal self even when the extended
family dominates the regional communal hierarchy: clearly they were
the landlords, marked by the different dress of the grandchildren,
their education and their Christianity (Kuzwayo 1985: 157). More-
over, “as a child from a Christian home” Kuzwayo (1985: 72) “was
strictly forbidden to associate in any way with the girls who had ac-
cepted Lebollo as part of their lives”, that is, traditional lives. Apart
from these disruptions subverting the overall impression the writer
wishes to convey of a communal self, at school away from home the
self shrinks from being singled out, for instance in the dress length
incident at St Francis’s College; instead it is eager to join senior stu-
dents, mentors and role-models for “at the hands of some of the
nuns” the young Kuzwayo (1985: 83) self felt bitter and frustrated.
The extended family and its surrogates at school and in later life
form the matrix for the training of the ideal communal self, particu-
larly the female as will become clearer below. Kuzwayo (1985: 99)
defensively explains as follows: “Other racial groups may deride the
extended family as being backward and outdated, but it is a pillar of
strength to black people”. It is this communal self which is fore-
grounded, also in a sense de-gendered, de-classed and de-tribalised
(all to create the illusion of sameness) to depict not only the ubuntu
self but also the black solidarity of brothers, sisters, fathers and
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mothers, in the face of inroads made by destructive apartheid. The
framing sections of the text, parts one and three, as generalising do-
cumentaries, serve to reinforce this impression.
Even when differentiated, like Miss Minah Tembeka Soga, “who
was outstanding in her contribution when the constitution and poli-
cy of the Convention were drafted”, it is to enhance the togetherness
of women and men “for the advancement and liberation of the Afri-
can nation in South Africa” (Kuzwayo 1985: 101). To offset indivi-
dual contrariness and privileging, Charlotte Maxeke, the first natio-
nal president of the National Council of African Women, exhorts in
her presidential address at the second conference in Bloemfontein on
8 December 1938: “This work is not for yourselves — kill that spirit
of ‘self’ and do not live above your people, but live with them. If you
can rise, bring someone with you” (Kuzwayo 1985: 103). The Black
Consciousness movement is part and parcel of this communality, “a
concept which has created awareness among blacks about who they
are and were, and helped to build up the determination to regain
their strength and personality as a nation — for young and old alike”
(Kuzwayo 1985: 47).
But from what Derrida says it is a deliberate deviation; the self as
he conceives it is constructed in dialectic with projections from
others in the world around one. The “I” is determined by those out-
side who say “me” to me and help constitute the self, the “I” striven
for (Derrida 1985: 51). Kuzwayo’s insistence on the opposite is eluci-
dated by Nhlapo below especially in the case of women.
5 The annihilation of the self
In more extreme circumstances the slave community in Beloved ope-
rates in a way that differs somewhat from Kuzwayo’s community. To
begin with, men and women slaves do not even belong to themselves
but, in a manner much worse than apartheid displacements, are “mo-
ved around like checkers”, never “loved”, but “bought”, “loaned
out”, “stored up”, “mortaged”, “won” or “stolen” or “seized” (Mor-
rison 1987: 23). If they run off they are “brought back” or “hanged”
(Morrison 1987: 23). In the everyday slave life of test and trial where
the suffering of men and women is in almost every way the same,
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slaves have to watch out for themselves and for one another if they
can, as the men, Paul D Garner, Paul F Garner, Paul A Garner, Halle
Suggs and Sixo of Sweet home do (Morrison 1987: 11).
6 The simultaneous socialising and re-claiming of 
the individual self
Those who are seen to rise above the group are frowned upon, as Baby
Suggs discovers after providing a feast for ninety people (Morrison
1987: 136). She feels the “free-floating repulsion” from her “friends
and neighbours” (Morrison 1987: 138). Because she gets above her-
self no one even bothers to warn her about the approaching slave-
catchers pursuing Sethe (Morrison 1987: 157). Sethe, too, incurs
their wrath for killing her child, for her self-isolation and her self-
sufficiency. She pays with “eighteen years of disapproval and a solita-
ry life” (Morrison 1987: 173).
But while behaviour with others is more or less homogenised and
controlled by disapproval and ostracism the individual self is not overt-
ly suppressed or downplayed as in Kuzwayo’s text. While the commu-
nal self is centred in Call me woman, the focus in Beloved is on the reco-
very of Sethe’s individual self in damning circumstances and exile from
the African identity base, some sense of which may be gathered from
the Kuzwayo text. The impulse to integrate and conform with the
community is superseded by the greater need to recuperate some sense
of self after prolonged, unceasing dehumanization. Sethe needs first to
claim “herself. Freeing yourself was one thing; claiming ownership of
that freed self was another” (Morrison 1987: 95). She once had “iron
eyes and backbone to match” which a schoolteacher had punched out
(Morrison 1987: 9). Her experiences are embodied in her flesh; milked,
raped and beaten, her body writes itself into recovery with its body
fluids in the text. Sethe is given voice in the text and her body is also
accepted as “legitimate text which can be used to inscribe itself out of
multiple conscriptions” (Busia 1990: 103).
Moreover, to go on living Sethe has to “keep the past at bay”
(Morrison 1987: 42). But when Paul D tells her Halle, who could not
help her, had seen her being milked and raped by the schoolteacher’s
two nephews while he (the schoolteacher) stood by, she just manages
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not to “break, fall or cry each time a hateful picture drifted in front
of her face” (Morrison 1987: 97). His own sense of self has taken such
a pounding that Paul D “shut down a generous portion of his head,
operating on the part that helped him walk, eat, sleep, sing” (Morri-
son 1987: 41).
The othering which causes the emptiness within is for Baby
Suggs “the desolated center where the self that was no self made its
home” (Morrison 1987: 140). Sethe circles around the empty and
dreaded spaces within herself even as she struggles to take control of
her own life. After the flight from Sweet home she says, “I did it. I got
us all out me using my own head. But it was more than that. It was
a kind of selfishness I never knew nothing about before” (Morrison
1987: 162). Her greatest act of love, into which, paradoxically, she is
driven as a slave-on-the-run is to kill her toddler to save her from be-
ing dragged back into slavery. As she says “She my daughter. She
mine [...] She had to be safe and I put her where she would be” (Mor-
rison 1987: 200).
Counteracting slave definitions in simultaneously enslaving-
exilic (empty) space is a constant battle which has to be tackled day
by day, fending off the bad and feeding on the good. When Beloved,
the embodiment of her own self-destructive consciousness, arrives,
Sethe loses the precarious hold she has on some sense of self and “sat
around like a rag doll, broke down, finally” (Morrison 1987: 243).
“She sat in the chair licking her lips like a chastised child while
Beloved ate up her life, took it, swelled up with it, grew taller on it”
(Morrison 1987: 250). Sethe “yielded” because of her guilt, her need
to expiate even though “what she had done was right because it came
from true love” (Morrison 1987: 251). Torn up within by the
apparent senselessness of the killing, “it was as though Sethe didn’t
really want forgiveness given; she wanted it refused. And Beloved
helped her out” (Morrison 1987: 252). When Beloved is eventually
driven away by thirty of the community’s women summoned by
Denver, their singing “broke over Sethe [...] she trembled like the
baptised in its wash” (Morrison 1987: 261).
There is an antidote to the dehumanising effects of the “‘Look’
every negro learned to recognise along with his ma’am’s tit” (Morri-
son 1987: 157); it is, as Baby Suggs, the “unchurched preacher”
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(Morrison 1987: 87), teaches Sethe and the other ex-slaves, to love
and heal themselves continuously and in the face of multiple ongoing
otherings, “looks”. This is essential because in spite of judgemental,
objectifying, othering “looks” from slave-owners and even one’s own
kind the self — dynamic, complex and resilient — has the capacity
if given the chance to react, oppose, and negotiate in the continual
re-arranging of itself, as it forms and reforms constantly under inter-
nal and external pressures and influences.
7. The emerging but conflicted individual self
Like the Sethe self, the Kuzwayo self is not unified, complete and
whole, all the more because of the importance given to the commu-
nal self. The individual self, the “I”, which is for the most part of her
youth and schooling underplayed/deferred, is forced to the forefront
when Aunt Blanche shatters the sense of family and communal mo-
therhood by casting her out into the world with the words, “There is
no home for you any more here” (Kuzwayo 1985: 105). The sense of
home that is equated with the wholeness of self fragments as the pro-
tagonist is othered into “a stranger, an intruder”, losing “all sense of
personal direction and identity” (Kuzwayo 1985: 107). Kuzwayo
(1985: 107) writes “I felt so rejected by the people and surroundings
I had once cherished as part of my very being”. Nhlapo (1991: 120)
explains:
[The] African value system does not perceive women as separate
entities but always as adjuncts to the family. A woman’s personhood
is lost in the group much more than a man’s is subsumed under
[the] so-called community principle.
Nhlapo (1991: 113) writes, moreover, of the “non-individual na-
ture” of African marriage and that “group interests are framed in fa-
vour of men”. In light of Nhlapo and Derrida, Kuzwayo’s represen-
tation of self needs to be adjusted to clarify that the woman-self is
trained to be more “we” than the man-self, which is more “I”. The
explanation given by Nhlapo helps to understand why Kuzwayo sub-
sequently blames herself and tries to appease her aunt in her “own
child-like way but all that failed” (Kuzwayo 1985: 105). With no
other way out within the cultural framework she has internalised, she
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goes to the father whom she barely knows to salvage some sense of
her fragmented self.
At this point, however, Kuzwayo begins to write transgressively, in
a sense against herself and her deepest convictions, to interrogate the
“we” though still in an indirect way. It is analogous in a way to the
African-American subversive rhetorical device of “signifying”, where
rebellious meanings are obscured in multiple, conflicting messages.
“Signifying” alternates with a rarer, more open moment when she
writes, “Thinking always of others can be a burden when one grows
older because it becomes second nature or second self” (Kuzwayo
1985: 114). For the first time, although in terms of the impersonal
“one”, there is recognition of a “first self”, the “I”, à la Derrida,
which has been trained to submerge itself in the “we” of the commu-
nal self. Hereafter, as represented in the text, there is a continual,
more discernible though tension-filled interplay between the indivi-
dual and the communal self, first and second selves, as the textual “I”
take as much control as she can over her life, her decisions and her
way in the world; but it is always in association with a couple, a fa-
mily, a group, for reasons explicated by Nhlapo above. And, signifi-
cantly, the time spent at Aunt Elizabeth’s in Heilbron is characteri-
sed as “a really helpful transitional period of weaning [...] away from
[her] almost dependent situation in Pimville” with her father (Kuz-
wayo 1985: 116). But the weaning is only from the immediate fami-
ly, towards other members of the extended family and other groups
— women’s singing, dancing, and debating groups where she “learn-
ed the basis of decision-making in personal and group matters”
(Kuzwayo 1985: 116).
Bearing Nhlapo and Maboreke (below) in mind this period is
only a hiatus till she makes her own home with “a life partner” with
whom she will “‘live happily ever after’” (Kuzwayo 1985: 122). This
hope and expectation are fuelled by the traditional construction of
the female that Maboreke (1991: 228-9) describes. It is worth quo-
ting at length because of its ramifications:
Africans in general and African women in particular identify them-
selves through a maze of relationships, namely, mother to so-and-so,
daughter of so-and-so, wife of so-and-so, etcetera, in which “so-and-
so” is always a man. African women are never viewed as separate in-
dividuals but rather as appendages of a man [...] African women feel
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this powerlessness when removed from the family wheel, and so at-
tach themselves to the family organism even more tightly. The obli-
gation this family membership generates is the price women pay for
membership of their family.
Societies such as ours are tightly structured, stratified, hedged in by
prescriptions, by the primacy of the communal good over individu-
al rights and interest (Maboreke 1991: 228-9).
These definitions, structures and limited choices are transmuted
into a romantic dream; it dissipates when the Kuzwayo self suffers
another blow but she “either pretended [she] did not see them or
[she] refused to believe what [she] saw in her marriage and husband”
(Kuzwayo 1985: 124). She undergoes
both physical and mental suffering. Day by day [she] realised [she]
was being humiliated and degraded, an experience [she has] in recent
years come to realise is suffered by many wives the world over, with-
in different races, cultures and religions (Kuzwayo 1985: 124).
It does not however strike her as a fundamentally gender/power
issue, a stance she maintains throughout the text, where apartheid op-
pression takes precedence over black male oppression. For example,
her husband’s behaviour towards her is seen as the result of her being
“a stranger and foreigner in the community”, the Aunt Blanche epi-
sode notwithstanding. When she is more forthcoming about her hus-
band’s cruelty it is to abstract the negative — “the violence, arro-
gance, meanness and downright selfishness, which prevailed in [her]
home” and personalise the positive — “his intelligence, his well-built
stature and handsome appearance, his financial acumen — even if this
was at the expense of his family” (Kuzwayo 1985: 127).
To keep a grip on herself during this traumatic period, like the
ex-slaves in Beloved, she blocks the memories from her mind; they
may not be dwelt on in the text either, perhaps because they are con-
sidered domestic and not public concerns; Boyce-Davies (1986: 126)
attributes the silences and gaps about the personal and the private to
the limits of propriety. Black male gender power is not a priority
either, although Kuzwayo does connect her experience with a much
wider gender oppression than she expresses awareness of above.
Whatever her reasons she says, “Even now, I find I cannot write in
detail about it” (Kuzwayo 1985: 124). With that she “decided to save
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[her]self for [her]self, and for [her] two sons” (Kuzwayo 1985: 125).
She reminds herself that her mother and teachers had taught her that
“unlike a beast, a human being is responsible for her action at all
times” (Kuzwayo 1985: 125).
But since what she decides constitutes a defiance of fundamental
cultural precepts she gives it careful thought and, after having assess-
ed her marriage “with a minimum of subjectivity” during a short res-
pite at her mother-in-law’s home, she leaves her husband and two
sons in order to save her life, at once violating the roles of mother and
obedient wife (Kuzwayo 1985: 130). It is a triumph of “I” and, like
Sethe’s escape in Beloved, it is her decision. As agent she writes, “This
time, I was not being forced out of my ‘home’; on the contrary the
decision was mine” (Kuzwayo 1985: 131). At the same time the blow
to the psyche is acknowledged, though somewhat tentatively: “All
the same, and perhaps I am wrong, I was pushed out psychologically”
(Kuzwayo 1985: 131). In a way similar to Sethe’s guilt over a more
violent act, the “I”, still in an insecure and uncertain double-bind in
Call me woman, is wracked with “challenging moments of guilt,
charged with endless questions [she] could not find adequate replies
to” (Kuzwayo 1985: 132).
On her return to her father, with “no more castles in the air but a
more realistic day-to-day approach to life” (Kuzwayo 1985: 132) and
though “brow-beaten, helpless and lost” (Kuzwayo 1985: 134), she
makes new contacts and becomes active in community groups. Her
growing confidence in herself is demonstrated in her discreet hand-
ling of her divorce, which however still leaves her feeling emotionally
empty. She is nevertheless determined “to blot out [her] past expe-
rience” (Kuzwayo 1985: 142). In spite of the stigma of divorce she
throws herself into the “freedom” that she begins to appreciate, works
in a film of Cry, the beloved country, and does community work for both
“[her]self and the community” (Kuzwayo 1985: 148). Besides her
work with the youth and women, after much thought and persuasion
she agrees to a second marriage. At the Transvaal YWCA she grows
in stature to become General Secretary although she is scared of the
“over-powering” women in the association (Kuzwayo 1985: 161).
Within the parameters laid down for black women she is “Ellen all the
time” and not a clone of her predecessor and mentor, Phyllis Nolu-
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thando Mzaidume (Kuzwayo 1985: 164). In her second marriage and
community work she is intent on proving herself; it is to overcome the
experience of “a disintegrating home and the unsettling divorce pro-
ceedings” and doubts about her “integrity”, her “self-image” and her
“worth” (Kuzwayo 1985: 181).
8. The self as mother
Kuzwayo’s need to overcome what she sees as failures, the result of
her early engendering, is intimately bound up with her acceptance of
the notion of black womanhood/motherhood. Her childhood has pre-
pared her for this as it has for woman-jobs such as domestic chores,
the making of a “home” for a family, and the caring professions. She
complains that this role is often undermined by “cultural influences
from other racial groups, and some of the harsh legislation which has
often disrupted family life in black rural communities, as well as the
hideous migrant labour system” (Kuzwayo 1985: 73). But none of
this has “succeeded in destroying the commitment of women to fulfil
their role as wives and mothers” (Kuzwayo 1985: 73). Further, mo-
therhood is referred to as an “instinct”, which she is prevented from
expressing, first by her husband, who has custody of their two sons,
and then by the influx control of apartheid law (Kuzwayo 1985:
185). Her second marriage, which makes her Mrs Kuzwayo, along
with other forms of recognition, restores her status especially in her
“new home; all these built [her] psychologically, emotionally and
physically” (Kuzwayo 1985: 180). And the call of motherhood which
was thwarted for so long is fulfilled by the birth of her third son,
Godfrey Ndabezibha Kuzwayo.
Her work outside the home is still within female boundaries, for
instance, child-care, cooking, sewing, knitting, first-aid and self-
help. In her text, which celebrates the strength, courage and achieve-
ments of black women, Kuzwayo writes to subvert negative stereo-
types of one kind (mainly attributed to the white apartheid state) and
in the process maintains and reinforces stereotypes of another (the
tradition of woman as generalised mother and care-giver). She writes
against the image of
The black woman, who through the centuries had been viewed by
the white state as unproductive in industry, as totally dependent on
her male counterpart, as helpless, unintelligent to the point of be-
ing useless and stupid — the woman who much against her will re-
signed herself to being labelled a ‘minor’ by the state (Kuzwayo
1985: 12-3).
At the same time she disrupts what she herself sets up, as she did
earlier with the ubuntu concept. She quotes examples of women who
do break out of traditional female occupations, like Mrs Esther Seo-
kelo, who drives a taxi. But this too is immediately overturned when
she evokes the mother in the woman taxi-driver who is called to play
a conciliatory role at times of crisis when the men in the  business
“need to settle differences amongst themselves” (Kuzwayo 1985: 51).
The ambivalence recurs in the case of Mrs Magdalene Sesedi who “be-
came director of a general dealer’s business” yet “was a perfect model
of womanhood, full of charm, beauty and dignity” (all in contiguous
sentences) (Kuzwayo 1985: 103). She also mentions black women in
political movements who work with the menfolk, and yet she puzzles
over “why there seemed to be no outstanding women in the ranks of
the ANC movement at that time” (Kuzwayo 1985: 139).
Desiree Lewis, writing in 1999, has remarked as well on the
gender ideology, “the restrictive conventions about motherhood that
shape Kuzwayo’s experience and her interpretation of experience”.
She further argues that Kuzwayo constructs a “womanhood that
stresses woman’s self-denial and inferiority” and “equates woman-
hood with motherhood” (Lewis 1999: 40).
As part of this stance Kuzwayo’s relationships with men, aside
from those with her first husband and some wayward men mentioned
in the text, are represented as cordial, respectful, encouraging and
supportive. Her stepfather and second husband encourage her to con-
tinue her education, for example. At the same time she has misgi-
vings about her sister Maria’s husband, Thari Pilane, and the restric-
tions and taboos that her sister will have to endure. She finally de-
rives comfort from the thought that Pilane’s “education had liberated
him from some of the most restrictive taboos and practices”; obvious-
ly her own first husband, an educated lecturer, slips her mind when
she translates the situation into terms of traditional culture versus
western education (Kuzwayo 1985: 117). She again ignores the gen-
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der dimension and the complicity between male domination and na-
tional oppression when she has to get her son’s signature for her pass-
port; to her it is another apartheid atrocity (Kuzwayo 1985: 240). Yet
it is a manifestation of the same male power, left unchallenged to
grow into violence, to which women are subjected in the timiti ses-
sions in Pimville. Although Kuzwayo is sympathetic towards women
who break apartheid laws and traditional mores to survive it is a com-
passion that glosses over abuse by husbands or lovers who beat them.
In comparison to Beloved the sexuality and the sense of body of the
generalised mother is elided and eluded. Nonetheless the extension
of the mother role and function outside the home “has become a
threat to some men” because it “brings women a new kind of equality
with their menfolk” (Kuzwayo 1985: 261). Driver (1990: 231) asso-
ciates this kind of female empowerment and female separation with
“Western feminism at a certain stage of its history” raising invidious
questions about womanism as against feminism.
Given the male reactions above and Nhlapo and Maboreke’s com-
ments quoted earlier, the reception of Kuzwayo’s speech in defence of
youths on trial becomes explicable. A man in court says to her, “You
are not an ordinary woman, you pleaded like a man, only a man could
speak the way you did” (Kuzwayo 1985: 227). Women are not per-
mitted to transgress boundaries set down for them; when they do
they threaten and frighten men, as related above, who fall back on
customary gender paradigms. In this sense the man in court first
places Kuzwayo, as she herself does with Mrs Seokelo and Mrs Sesedi,
outside the familiar — “not an ordinary woman”, but since there is
no such category at hand and she does break bounds he places her in
one more familiar —  “like a man, only a man could speak the way
you did”. In the words of Sidonie Smith (1980: 52-3) she “becomes
essentially a ‘phallic woman’, an artificial or man-made product” who
deserves “the cultural recognition that flows to her as a person who
embodies male-identified ideals”.
The need to categorise is ever-present, but the masculinising is
temporary, honorary, a “sojourn”, to echo an apartheid gatekeeping
term used by Kuzwayo earlier, and understood as such by both men
and women; the male-biased compliment ensures that women keep
to their proper place. The mechanism in no way interferes with the
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man’s own definition and sense of self which is, however, damaged by
apartheid practices of othering. Matshoba (1979: 18) writes:
[T]hat component of me which is man died countless times in one
lifetime. Only a shell of me remains to tell you of the other man’s
plight, which is in fact my own [...] To the same chain-gang do we
belong ...
but he only tells part of the story of the male self under apartheid and
omits the effects of that and perhaps earlier male conditioning which
play themselves out in abuse of women, as in the timiti sessions and
Kuzwayo’s marriage. At any rate he probably explains why Kuzwayo
does not at any point openly protest the truncated definition of black
women; she reinforces it in a way, as do most of the women celebra-
ted, by merely expanding the pre-set roles within the traditional pa-
triarchal framework. Her writing is mainly against the negative ste-
reotype that she sees predominantly as an apartheid construction. In
addition, there is in her revisioning and own transgressions, quite
far-reaching at times, often a sense of ambivalence and reluctance, as
if she is in battle with herself. For the most part her revisioning still
functions within old constrictions so that “mama-Africa” becomes
“super-mama” or “suffering-mama”, and remains confined within the
role-range of woman as mother/wife/sister, destined, to some extent,
by instinct, by biology, by nature. Lewis (1999: 40) connects Kuz-
wayo’s eulogising of women as mothers to the mother-icon in nation-
alist myth-making where “women are ennobled yet simultaneously
depoliticised and dehumanised”.
9. Reconstructing the self as mother and sexual being
While both Kuzwayo and Morrison re-situate their central textual
creations in a dynamic context rather than the  fixed world which has
buried and distorted them, the effects achieved differ somewhat.
Kuzwayo, for example, carries herself through an idea of expanded
motherhood even as she transgresses (within the limits described
above) major patriarchal structures. Morrison, on the other hand, and
in the absence of an African identity base within her textual reconfi-
gurations, is more challenging and probing as she renames the com-
plications of mothering, sexuality, bodies and male-female relation-
ships in slavery and its aftermath. For instance, black women in
American literature have been depicted as “either sexually loose and
therefore tempters of men, or obedient and subservient mammies”
(McKay 1997: 152). But the truth about Ella, for example, is that
she had been locked up “for more than a year” by “two men — a
father and son”. “You couldn’t think up”, Ella had said, “what them
two done to me” (Morrison 1987: 119). The whore is also forced into
becoming a “breeder”, further distorting the image of black women
and motherhood. The result in Baby Suggs’s case is “eight children
with different men” (Morrison 1987: 209). Sethe’s mother had
thrown her white-begotten children away, raising questions about
the maternal instinct in the face of forced motherhood and slave-rape.
In a more wholesome sense of motherhood, but in the most trying
circumstances, Sethe struggles to keep her children. As a mother she
faces an extreme test when in an almost inexplicable act of love she
kills one of them to prevent its being taken back into slavery. Her
two sons run away from 124 and all she is left with is Denver, her last
born. After a time she stops expecting the boys’ return “and their
thirteen-year-old faces faded completely into their baby ones, which
came to her only in sleep” (Morrison 1987: 39).
Sethe, unlike the Kuzwayo self, confronts the men who threaten
her motherhood. Besides the paradoxical infanticide, she quarrels
with Paul D over Denver because to her “Grown don’t mean nothing
to a mother. A child is a child. They get bigger, older, but grown?
What’s that supposed to mean? In my heart it don’t mean a thing”
(Morrison 1987: 45).
Her intense love is described by Paul D as “too thick”, presump-
tuous for a slave women who does not even own herself. But in her
view that is the only type worth feeling: “Love is or it aint. Thin love
aint love at all” (Morrison 1987: 164). Sethe may have loved too
much but she is not a crazy murderer. Stamp Paid explains this to
Paul D when he has trouble reconciling the girl he knew at Sweet home
with the fiercely protective mother: “She love those children. She was
trying to outhurt the hurter” (Morrison 1987: 234).
Her hope, like Kuzwayo’s, is to have a family again: Paul D, Den-
ver and herself, where she could feel again, “count on something” and
not be afraid that it will be taken away (Morrison 1987: 38). But she
also has doubts about Paul D, recalling Kuzwayo’s reservations about
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her brother-in-law. She remembers Baby Suggs saying, “A man ain’t
nothing but a man” (Morrison 1987: 23). A son, however, is another
matter, as the mother-son bond is more reliable. And she should
know, as her son, Halle, bought her freedom by working “five years of
Sundays” (Morrison 1987: 11).
Like the apartheid experiences recorded by Matshoba, slavery has,
but to a much greater extent, debased Paul D; he tells Sethe that the
farmyard rooster, Mister, is “free. Better than me [...] Mister was al-
lowed to be and stay what he was [...] Schoolteacher changed me. I
was something else and that something was less than a chicken sit-
ting in the sun on a tub” (Morrison 1987: 72). At the same time
Sethe “knew Paul D was adding something to her life — something
she wanted to count on but was scared to” (Morrison 1987: 95). And
“she wanted him in her life” (Morrison 1987: 99).
But to be really free she needs to get to “a place where [she] could
love anything [she] chose — not to need permission for desire — well
now, that was freedom” (Morrison 1987: 162). Baby Suggs is con-
demned for her sexuality, which is automatically associated with the
stereotype of the loose black woman; “slaves not supposed to have plea-
surable feelings on their own; their bodies not supposed to be like that,
but they have to have as many children as they can to please whoever
owned them” (Morrison 1987: 209). As part of her project to reclaim
the self she advises Sethe “to listen to [her] body and love it” (Morrison
1987: 209). After the departure of Beloved Paul D helps Sethe recover
by washing her all over, as Baby Suggs had done once before. The Paul
D-Sethe relationship harks back to Kuzwayo’s relationship with her se-
cond husband, but with more openness and detail.
Morrison has probed the motherhood role to offset the whore
/mammie binary and reveal its more complex aspects. For instance
she shows Sethe to be capable of caring for and loving her children
even to the point of killing one because of slavery; Sethe and Baby
Suggs are also portrayed as sexual beings who are still able to take joy
from bodies that have been severely damaged in enslavement. Morri-
son also depicts the complications in the relationships of damaged
males and females and women confronting the problems caused by
gender power. For instance, she uncovers the connections between
patriarchy (white men) and the racism of slavery (as Kuzwayo does
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with white patriarchy and apartheid) and between patriarchy (white
and black men) and abuse of women. Paul D, apparently an exceptio,
who shared Sethe’s slave life and had never ill-treated a woman,
comes across as being her equal, with the potential to develop their
relationship into friendship. He says to Sethe: “It’s good you know,
when you got a woman who is a friend of your mind”, which takes
us back to Kuzwayo’s relationship with her second husband, about
which not much is said (Morrison 1987: 273).
What Kuzwayo does, however, is to provide details about African
identity in Africa which are conspicuously (and with good reason) ab-
sent from Beloved. It turns out, however, that the absence and the
gender-levelling of the slave experience open a space within which to
make greater gender leaps. It is also the locus for the gaps and eva-
sions of Kuzwayo to be made up for or transformed, in a sense, by
Morrison, who provides significant details about, for example, wo-
man’s sexuality, the damaged manhood of the black male and, hence,
the need for restraining criticism. Driver (1990: 236) writes that in
South African terms woman as mother to the male “must (instead of
humiliating men further) restore to them their masculinity”. And
Miriam Tlali says that African women have power, a maternal power
which African men acknowledge and at the same time try to coun-
teract in order to define their masculinity. It works thus: to find him-
self the male has to separate himself from his mother’s strength; the
mother/wife then has to ensure that she helps him define his mascu-
linity; it is by stroking the male ego that the mother/wife defines
herself (Tlali 1989: 74-5). The pains taken to elaborate and senti-
mentalise the mother concept, harking back to the second half of the
whore/mammie binary mentioned in relation to Morrison and Tlali,
somehow smack of a whole range of cultural devices to bamboozle
and keep women shackled. More gravely it is subordination in
pseudo-elevation which provides a hospitable environment for
instances of female abuse such as those recorded by Kuzwayo in her
first marriage and the timiti sessions.
10. Conclusion
While both writers write to correct, revise and open up the overdeter-
mined self to other possibilities, this occurs in the midst of ongoing
and often rigid predetermining. The point of the comparative critical
reading of the texts was to point out connections with and differences
from each other in terms of black feminisms and, where necessary,
white feminisms, but principally to underline the plurality of differ-
ence and ontology. The self was found in the text to be not a clear-cut
unified single entity but problematised in a complex and often un-
predictable network of overlapping and criss-crossing elements.
Caught up in words, identity appears to be not so much a thing as an
occurrence made possible in “political, theoretical, self-analyzing
practice” so that “relations of the subject in social reality” may “be re-
articulated from [...] historical experience” (De Lauretis 1981: 197).
Such a process is continuous, tentative and recursive because of its
own dynamics, which come into play and are mirrored in the writing
process which is fuelled by memory and interpretation as referred to
by Sutherland (2001). The writer selects reflections to portray identi-
ty in narrative form so that the self finally defined is either enabled or
constrained. Both Kuzwayo and Morrison present versions that reflect
certain notions of the self and aspects of black feminist theory. The
result, the self meant to be known in a certain way, calls into question
Kuzwayo’s use of “I” and even more of “we”. And the tangled ambi-
guities of motherhood and black solidarity against racism in Kuzwayo
become in Morrison the generative source for a more nuanced, relati-
vised way of tackling power issues in gender relations.
To elaborate: in this transversal reading process of the two texts
the self is first shown taking its measure from the structural princi-
ples of “exile”, denoting alienation, and “home”, denoting security
and identity. The texts read into each other also help to bring to light
a reversal of the “home” principle, the rigid, unchanging space of
gender-binaries — that is gender-specific characteristics, roles and
functions, exacerbated to an extent by apartheid definitions. So, too,
the “exile” graphically and painfully dramatised in Morrison
transmutes into potential, free-floating space for the disintegration of
male/female characteristics and roles, as Paul D begins to exemplify,
and the creation of another kind of self. Gender specifics, qualities
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and categories, over and above biological imperatives, begin to come
apart in the space that opens up in Morrison, despite the  predeter-
minations of slavery. In open transversal space, in contrast to Kuz-
wayo’s culturally-embedded closed hierarchical space, there is con-
stant movement between gender-specific characteristics so that the
tenderness and compassion of Paul D is not female but human. In
this sense the space of exile brought on by slavery is transformed
from utter alienation to possibility for the ex-slaves, providing room
for the development not of gender-specific attributes but of human
qualities, roles and functions.
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